Who, or what, was responsible for the devastating economic calamity that afflicted the industrial economies in the late 1920s and 1930s? For Liaquat Ahamed, a former investment manager and economist for the World Bank and now a trustee with the Brookings Institution, the answer lies with four central bankers who in the 1920s had enormous power over the fate of the industrialized world. In Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), he paints a vivid portrait of Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, Émile Moreau of the Banque de France, and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, and how their rigid adherence to the Gold standard during the 1920s trapped their economies in a paradigm of debt and precluded the flexibility needed to address the cascading world financial crises of 1929 to 1932.
Ahamed’s story is presented with stirringly prose and – despite the million here, billion there, the decimal points flying from page to page – in a manner that make macroeconomics simple, but not simplistic. Although his quartet worked within the constraints of the international system that had just emerged from the First World War, and in particular the vindictive peace imposed by the Allies on Germany through the Treaty of Versailles, Ahamed’s argument is that these four officials were so wedded to the Gold standard that they were not capable of imagining its failure to provide stability for the world’s economy.
Yet it seems unfair to say – as the work’s subtitle suggests – that these four bankers “broke the world.” Certainly they had a role to play, especially as Ahemad points out in their rigid adherence to the Gold standard. Yet other factors and officials set the stage for the failure of the world’s economies. The political settlement at Versailles, which imposed such severe economic reparation on a defeated Germany, placed a burden on foreign exchange that dominated economic decision making for the next decade. Moreover, after decades of the Gold standard, many – not just bankers, but businesses and political actors as well – found it difficult to break free of the presumptions about how the Gold standard ensured economic stability. Finally, Ahamed seems to implicitly recognize (p. 439) that had a Federal Reserve acted quickly and pumped more liquidity into the market in 1931, rather than as it did in 1932, that the wave of bank failures that began in Austria may have been mitigated in the United States.
Thus, although Ahamed recognizes that the issue of reparations dominated the 1920s and that crisis decision making might have limited the spread of economic damage, he seems to overstretch by elevating these four bankers to such pre-eminence. Had Benjamin Strong lived past 1928 perhaps he might have provided greater imagination and leadership, and certainly a poorly organized and led Federal Reserve Board precluded vigorous action in the face of the calamity. But those who remained were limited by other factors, authored by other actors, which also had a role to play in the economic failure of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
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